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The consolidation of Spanish geopolitical and military preeminence in 
Central and South America (despite Portuguese pretensions in Brazil) 
during the 16th century coincided with a period of rapid economic growth 
in Spain’s colonies. The Viceroyalty of Peru,1 established in 1542, was an 
exceptional example of Spanish colonial economic dynamism. From the 
region’s initial settlement, the mining of precious metals, the encomienda 
system, and the enslavement and exploitation of Native peoples, 
provided a solid, if somewhat undiversified, foundation for the young 
Peruvian economy. The Spanish crown’s jealous possession of the 
mineral wealth in the New World colonies engendered a singularly 
invasive and mercantilist colonial economic policy. As a result, Spanish 
policy profoundly influenced the development of the Peruvian economy, 
molding its construction to maximize the colony’s utility to the mother 
country. Spanish policy rarely exerted the full and intended impact 
envisaged by Spanish administrators, but the effects were sufficient to 
leave a debilitating legacy of dependence on primary product export, 
vastly unequal land distribution, and significant socio-economic 
stratification, often along racial lines.  
Eventually, the inflexibility of the Peruvian economy, finite 
amounts of precious metals, and stifling Spanish policy brought 
economic stagnation and discontent to the colony while bullion imports 
                                                       
1 Note: when I refer to “Peru” I am referring to the geographical region known 
as the Viceroyalty of Peru during the 16th century not the contemporary state 
named Peru. I will use Peru and Viceroyalty of Peru interchangeably. When I 
refer to the present-day nation of Peru, I will express this reference in text.   
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caused a ruinous period of inflation in Spain. However, during the 16th 
century, Peru’s wealth and economic dynamism made the region the 
most valuable overseas Spanish territory and the foundation of Spain’s 
commercial empire in the Americas.  
   
The Establishment of the Viceroyalty of Peru 
 
The Spanish crown formally established the Viceroyalty of Peru 
in 1542 in the midst of significant internal conflict and violence in the 
colony.2 Pizarro’s initial conquest of the territory in the early 1530s was 
incomplete and Spanish pacification of the rebellious Native peoples, 
especially the Inca, was not effectively completed until the execution of 
the final Inca emperor in 1572.3 Despite the enduring chaos and conflict 
initiated by the clash of civilizations, the Viceroyalty of Peru’s first five 
decades witnessed a burgeoning colonial population (native populations 
continued to fall, principally due to disease) and a booming economy. As 
a result of Spanish mercantilist economic policy and Peru’s vast mineral 
wealth, the viceroyalty developed an economic dependence on primary 
commodity export to the Old World. Spanish mercantilism, which, in 
theory, was the most oppressive of the European empires in the 16th and 
17th centuries, involved the effective restriction of colonial trade to within 
Spanish territory. But smuggling was rampant, and for many decades, 
these restrictions did not apply to direct trade with Asia (this is due to 
both lapses in policy making and failure of implementation). Only the 
failure of Spanish policy, combined with the unintended effect of 
protectionism, permitted diversification into basic manufactured goods, 
shipping, and commerce. The overwhelmingly dominant economic 
sectors were mining (especially precious metals) and agriculture – both 





                                                       
2 Kim MacQuarrie. The Last Days of the Incas. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 
2007), map 2. - The territory of the viceroyalty theoretically extended from 
roughly the current location of the Panama Canal in the north, to the [disputed] 
line of demarcation established by the Treaty of Tordesillas [1494] in the east, to 
Cape Horn in the south, and to the Pacific Ocean in the west. However, Spanish 
control never extended beyond the contemporary southern border of Uruguay in 
the south nor into the Andes Mountains and the Amazon rainforest in the east. 
Moreover, Spanish colonists settled mainly in the region composed of 
contemporary northern Chile, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, and Bolivia 
3 Carlos Batreas, Daniel Chocano, Teodoro Martinez, and Ruben Ugarte. 
Compendio Historico del Peru. (Lima: Milla Batres, 1993), 16; 390-391.   




At the conclusion of the 15th century, an increasingly robust and 
integrated European economy was emerging from the prolonged 
commercial malaise of the Middle Ages. The expanding economic activity 
that accompanied the general revival of trade and commerce produced an 
acute dearth of hard currency in Europe.4 Thus, the search for new 
sources of bullion beyond the increasingly exhausted mines of Europe 
was a principal motivator of European overseas expansion during the 
16th century. The size of colonial Peru’s population and the dynamism of 
its economy were direct consequences of the region’s vast mineral wealth. 
Mining provided the foundation of the Peruvian economy. 
Many scholars recognize three distinct stages of colonial silver 
mining: “accumulation” – commandeering the metal from the Native 
Americans; “panning” – sifting through the soil for bits of silver; and 
“vein mining” – which involves digging shafts or adits (horizontal access 
tunnels, in contrast to vertical shafts) to a given intersection point with 
the target lode.5 In Peru, the conical form of target mountains allowed 
miners to accomplish extraction through adits, some only a few yards 
long while others stretched hundreds of yards and branched off in 
complex tunnel networks.6 Because of their horizontal structure, adits 
were safer and more reliable than vertical shafts, and reduced the human 
and capital demands of extraction.    
Initial precious metal exports from both Peru and New Spain 
(contemporary Mexico and the southwest United States) were supplied 
through Spanish expropriation of Native American mineral wealth. 
Between the start of Pizarro’s military expedition in 1531 and 1536, the 
original conquistadors sent enormous quantities of gold and silver to 
Europe, and became “the equivalent of [contemporary] multi-
millionaires.” Those who chose to remain in Peru “had already retired to 
                                                       
4 Clarence Haring. "American Gold and Silver Production in the First Half of 
the Sixteenth Century." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 29, no. 3 (1915): 433-
479. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1885462 (accessed November 25, 2010). 
5 Donald J. Mabry. Colonial Latin America. (Coral Springs, FL: Llumina Press, 
2002), 25. 
6 D.A. Brading and Harry E. Cross. "Colonial Silver Mining: Mexico and 
Peru." The Hispanic American Historical Review 52, no. 4 (1972): 551. – This is based 
on information for the Potosí mines. Primary information regarding mining in 
other Peruvian centers during the 16th century is scarce. However, one can safely 
extrapolate that Potosí and other Peruvian mines shared many characteristics 
based on uniform smelting techniques, similarities cited in works on later 
centuries, and the relatively uniform geographical and societal composition of 
the Viceroyalty of Peru   
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fabulously large estates.”7 The first Spaniards in Peru sought to attain and 
preserve a parasitic relationship with Incan society. Pizarro strove to 
control of the Incan elite through whom he sought to “control 
everything…− land, labor, gold, silver, women – everything that this 
obviously rich empire had to offer.”8 At one point, even the Incan 
Emperor (The Inca), Atahualpa, bargained with Pizarro for his life (and 
hence de facto political control of the remnants of Incan Empire) with his 
silver and gold possessions.9 However, the combined trends of declining 
native Peruvian population, falling native production of precious metals, 
increasing emigration from Spain, and Spanish seizure of all accessible 
precious metal reserves, eventually terminated Spanish freeloading as a 
viable sole means of attaining personal wealth. From approximately 1540 
onward, the Spanish colonists gradually abandoned sponging and 
assumed an increasing share of the burden of organically developing and 
directing commercial enterprises. Nevertheless, the Natives continued to 
supply cheap labor in Spanish mines and smelting works. 
The transition to Spanish leadership of mining operations was 
sporadic and incomplete during the 16th century. Spanish immigrants 
were relatively ignorant of mining and metallurgy and “drew on native 
mining and refining techniques.”10 This was especially true in Peru where 
the native Andeans were skilled in underground mining, smelting, and 
refining and “were familiar with gold, silver, copper, and tin.”11 The 
native populations proved so adept at producing silver that until “1570, 
Spanish mine owners effectively rented their mines to Indian 
managers.”12 Spanish political control afforded Spaniards a nominal role 
in developing mines, and allowed powerful colonists to claim a share of 
metal output. However, Indians retained the knowledge and skills 
necessary to operate the mines and refineries, and, consequently, effective 
control over Peruvian mineral deposits. The Spanish contributed metal 
tools to the production process, but otherwise occupied an unproductive, 
rent-seeking position (slightly modified from its original blatant 
parasitism) in the mining sector of the economy.  
Nevertheless, Spanish colonists hungrily sought out and 
systematically exploited the mineral wealth of Peru. The initial discoveries 
of precious metals in Peru brought a wave of speculative investment to 
the colony, primarily undertaken by members of the upper class seeking 
quick profits from colonial ventures. Joint stock companies, limited 
                                                       
7 Kim MacQuarrie. Last Days of the Incas, 17.  
8 Ibid., 88. 
9 Ibid., 95-96. 
10 Peter Bakewell. A History of Latin America. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), 176. 
11 Ibid., 176. 
12 Ibid., 176. 
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liability, and the like, were unheard of. State subsidies through land 
grants, coerced labor, and the exemption of low-grade silver from 
taxation further stimulated capital accumulation and investment.  
Peruvian mineral wealth proved even vaster than that of the Viceroyalty 
of New Spain. Principal mining hubs developed at Carabaya (1542) and 
Chachapoyas (c.1550) modern-day Peru; Popayán and Antioquia (1540s) 
in what is now Columbia; and the iconic center of Potosí (discovered 
1545; on-line in the late 1540s) in present day Bolivía.13 Estimates of 
Peruvian silver and gold production through about 1570 diverge wildly 
among scholars, mainly as a result of the scarce, often inaccurate, and 
sometimes conflicting accounts kept by Spanish officials, travelers, and 
historians.14 It is likely that the value of total precious metal exports was 
tremendous relative to the value of the total supply of bullion in Europe, 
evidenced by rapid, imported-bullion-fueled inflation in the 17th and 
century.  
The 1560s brought profound change to the mining and 
metallurgy sector of the Peruvian economy. Data for the Potosí mine (a 
fairly accurate proxy for the overall productivity of Spanish mining 
operations throughout the Viceroyalty of Peru) 15 indicate declining ore 
yields and rising production costs.16 Fortunately for the colony’s 
established interests, a new refining process called “the patio process” or 
“amalgamation”, which uses mercury to bind with certain metals (i.e. 
silver and gold), was imported from Germany and adapted for use on an 
industrial scale.17 The new process was rapidly implemented with support 
from the colonial government to catalyze a revival of the mining sector in 
Peru. A state-owned monopoly controlled the mercury supply, which was 
produced domestically in Peru, but had to be imported by other Spanish 
colonies.18 In this manner, the Spanish Crown exercised indirect control 
over silver production in the realm.19 Combined with additional 
economic reforms (including the introduction of the mita draft labor 
system to mines and simplification of the tax regime) implemented 
during the 1570s by the Viceroy Francisco de Toledo, colonial silver 
mining experienced a prolonged boom. After a gradual decline from peak 
                                                       
13 Ibid., 176. 
14 Clarence Haring. "American Gold and Silver Production in the First Half of 
the Sixteenth Century." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 29, no. 3 (1915) p449-
450. 
15 Engel Sluiter. The Gold and Silver of Spanish America: c. 1572 - 1648. (Berkeley, 
Calif.: Bancroft Library, Univ. of California, 1998), 61. 
16 Bakewell, History of Latin America, 179 - The Potosí mine held the title of the 
world’s largest silver producer for nearly two centuries. 
17 Bakewell, History of Latin America, 178 
18 Mabry, Colonial Latin America, 125. 
19 Ibid., 125. 
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production achieved in 1565, total amount of silver produced and 
declared for taxation in 1580 in the Potosí Treasury were triple the 1570 
amount.20 
One of the many significant effects of the adoption of 
amalgamation refining was the consequent reduction of Spanish reliance 
on Native American knowledge and skilled laborers. The greater 
efficiency of the patio process rendered native techniques obsolete.21 
Moreover, the heavily capital-intensive process afforded the politically 
dominant and comparatively wealthy Europeans greater de facto control 
over mining operations. Many of the skilled natives who earned a decent 
wage working in the mines or smelting works were robbed of their 
sources of livelihood. Silver output in Potosí continued to grow steadily 
until leveling off in the 1590s with increasing extraction costs and 
declining ore quality.22 Nevertheless, by the final decade of the 16th 
century, mining was indisputably the dominant industry in Peru.23  
The vast mineral wealth in the Viceroyalty of Peru induced 
invasive and exploitative colonial economic policy from the Spanish 
government. The Spanish Crown believed precious metal imports from 
the American colonies would provide an abundant source of tax revenue 
needed to finance yawning fiscal deficits produced by Spanish military 
adventurism in Europe.24 Early conquistadors and royal officials established 
auxiliary treasury branches near significant mining operations where total 
silver output could be immediately declared for taxation. Royal mints 
soon followed in Lima and Potosí. Throughout the 16th century, the total 
tax rate on newly mined silver remained a flat 21%. This produced fairly 
consistent revenue streams from the Potosí treasury alone of 
approximately 200,000 to 300,000 pesos25  annually from 1556 to 1575, 
                                                       
20 Sluiter, Gold and Silver of Latin America, 69 Table B-VII. 
21 Bakewell, History of Latin America, 179. 
22 Sluiter, Gold and Silver of Latin America, 69 Table B-VII. 
23 Bakewell, History of Latin America, 180. 
24 Carlos Assadourian. "The Colonial Economy: The Transfer of the European 
System of Production to New Spain and Peru." Journal of Latin American 
Studies. vol. 24 (1992): 56. 
25 A peso in this case refers to the silver coin minted at the various Spanish 
colonial mints worth 8 reales. An 8 real coin had a set weight of 423.9 grains 
(27.47 grams) of .9305 fine silver (source: University of Notre Dame, “Spanish 
Silver: General Introduction (URL: 
http://www.coins.nd.edu/ColCoin/ColCoinIntros/Sp-Silver.intro.html)).  I will 
examine the colonial money supply in greater detail in the subsequent section 
titled “Currency and Money Supply”. For more detailed information regarding 
silver declared and tax collected see the tables in the Appendix (source Sluiter, p 
69, 71, 73 – Table B- VII)      
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and approximately 700,000 to 1,000,000 pesos from 1576 to 1600.26 The 
crown jealously sought to protect this handsome revenue stream and 
soon developed a heavy reliance upon the American mines to finance 
government spending. Silver bullion that was not earmarked for export 
was either fashioned into various consumer goods or minted into coins. 
The Spanish government established an effective monopoly on silver 
imports to the home country by licensing a single merchant company, the 
Casa de Contratacion, to receive all imports from, and dispatch exports 
to, the American colonies in 1503. The crown implemented a similar 
monopolistic arrangement in a single port city of each Viceroyalty. (In 
Peru this was the El Callao port in Lima). This method of organization, 
(together with the regularized oceanic colonial trade schedules impressed 
by the compulsory convoy system) allowed the Spanish government to 
profit from the consequent trade bottleneck and (theoretically) ensure 
payment of the “royal fifth” on all silver.27 The state’s monopoly on 
mercury also allowed the Crown to indirectly control the supply, and thus 
the price, of silver. However, the government often required immediate 
revenue from mined silver, and these short-run fiscal necessities always 
trumped long run economic interests. Finally, government policy 
provided massive incentives for smuggling and corruption, which were 
rampant within the private sector and civil service. Illicit trade with 
foreign colonists and profiteering public office holders were accepted 
aspects of Peruvian commerce and administration. The Crown’s attempts 
at total control over colonial precious metals could be accurately 
construed as futile.  
Peru’s vibrant mining sector provided a solid foundation for the 
colonial economy as a whole. Large industrial boom-towns sprang to life 
near precious metal mines.28 Mining provided an outlet for savings by 
affording the wealthy opportunities for profitable capital investment. 
Investment by the middle and lower classes was all but unheard of. The 
labor-intensive extraction and refining process absorbed politically-
troublesome native laborers, some as virtual wage slaves, some (especially 
those with relevant skill sets) for competitive pay. The mines and their 
employees stimulated demand for agriculture, metal and leather goods, 
and housing, among goods and services.29  Prosperous commercial hubs 
developed to serve the materials industry. As the sole port legally 
involved in transatlantic trade, Lima expanded particularly rapidly. The 
military presence of the Spanish in Lima also stimulated demand for 
colonial goods. In addition, the mining sector provided a large market for 
                                                       
26 Sluiter, Gold and Silver of Latin America, 69. 
27 Bakewell, History of Latin America, 200. 
28 Ibid., 181. 
29 Mabry, Colonial Latin America, 125. 
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contemporary industrial technology and capital goods. The industry 
exhibited advanced specialization of labor and significant utilization of 
technology by contemporary standards.30   
The long-term effects of massive bullion imports and reckless 
fiscal expenditure by the Spanish government were the combined 
debacles of ruinous hyperinflation and fiscal ruin. However, these 
adverse consequences of bullion imports only materialized after the 16th 
century, and contemporary economic theory was insufficient to allow 
foresight of the eventual inflation, or to establish a causal relationship 
when the price increases occurred. The fiscal calamity was largely a result 
of the Spanish Crown’s addiction to silver revenues and fondness for 
military expeditions and expenditure. The silver bullion fueled the 
Spanish economy’s shift to unproductive military output. Moreover, 
defense of the mines and treasure fleets from pirates and privateers 
placed a considerable burden on the government, and depressed shipping 
overall. Although they were the backbone of Peru’s economy in the 16th 
century, Spanish mining enterprises were far from economically efficient. 
They were often poorly managed, stifled by regulation, and became long-




When Francisco Pizarro, gained a sufficient degree of effective 
control over what would, in the 1530s, become the Viceroyalty of Peru 
he immediately began exercising unofficially assumed dictatorial powers 
over the territory to grant tracts of land (mercedes) to other conquistadors 
and settlers.31 He also began assigning encomiendas, often arbitrarily or 
based on his opinion of the receiver.32 Although this seems to be a 
blatantly illegal, even treasonous, assumption of royal power by Pizarro, 
the employment of de facto political power by a conquistador under such 
circumstances was fairly common. Generally, such grants by royal agents 
were subsequently endorsed by the crown, or an appropriately vested 
representative of the Spanish government, and only then made 
permanent.33 The grants were rarely invalidated. Encomenderos were the 
first to apply for royal mercedes because their grants of native laborers did 
not include an estate.34 The encomenderos were given quasi-feudal powers 
over their respective populations of Native Americans, including the 
                                                       
30 Bakewell, History of Latin America, 181. 
31 Ibid., 191. 
32 Keith Davies. Landowners in Colonial Peru. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 
1984), 12-18. 
33 Bakewell, History of Latin America, 191. 
34 Ibid., 191. 
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ability to exact tribute in goods or labor. Many encomenderos chose to 
employ their coerced labor forces in mining, prospecting, building urban 
structures in colonial cities, or in other enterprises, but a large fraction 
chose agriculture.35 The resulting combination of encomienda and mercedes 
was the concentration of landholding in massive estates called haciendas or 
estancias (both terms are descended from the Roman term and policy of 
latifundia).36 Strangely, both the merced and encomienda systems were 
discontinued and in some cases forcibly abolished by the Spanish Crown 
in the 1560s and 1570s.37 Nevertheless, many huge estates owned by 
Spanish proprietors and fueled by coerced native or slave labor endured 
and prospered. Thus, from the initial settlement of Peru, an oligarchic 
distribution of arable land was institutionalized in colonial society.  
From the outset, the colonists stubbornly attempted to preserve 
the traditional Spanish diet in their new, alien surroundings. The 
astronomical cost of importing European products impeded the rate of 
the transition, but the long-term trend of transplantation persisted.38 
Nevertheless, the initially abundant varieties of local food led to a partial 
adoption of native foods; a Spanish-American fusion diet developed. 
European and native livestock mingled in fields. The transplantation of 
grapes to the Pacific coastal plain enabled a large domestic wine market 
to develop. Maize and potatoes were staples of the colonial diet. Maize 
and wheat became the Spanish colonial equivalent of “agro industries” 
due to their universality and oligarchic industry structure (increasing 
returns to scale allowed haciendas to dominate markets).39  Other foods 
such as chocolate, avocados, tomatoes, and chilis were unevenly adopted 
by the Spanish.40 Despite tacit adoption of native crops, the Spanish 
newcomers almost uniformly spurned high crop concentration and 
human labor-intensive native farming techniques, preferring European 
methods based on decentralized large-scale cultivation, and reliance on 
plough and draught animals.41      
The internal turmoil of the 1540s civil war significantly impeded 
Spanish efforts to construct a sustainable domestic food supply. The 
Native American agricultural system was irreparably damaged by the 
Spanish conquest, the subsequent civil war, and the societal upheaval 
caused by the growing toll of European diseases on the native 
populations. Prices of wheat and maize quadrupled between 1544 and 
                                                       
35 Davies, Landowners in Colonial Peru, 20. 
36 Assadourian, “Transfer of the European System of Production,” 60. 
37 Ibid., 56. 
38 Davies, Landowners in Colonial Peru, 22. 
39 Assadourian, “Transfer of the European System of Production,” 61. 
40 Bakewell, History of Latin America, 190. 
41 Assadourian, “Transfer of the European System of Production,” 62. 
Spanish Colonial Economies | 10 
 
1547.42 The end of civil war in 1548 brought relative peace (sporadic 
conflicts with the native populations continued until 1572) and economic 
and immigration booms, which further stimulated demand for 
foodstuffs.43  
By the 1560s, the original agricultural economienda model was fast 
losing economic viability.44 The Native American depopulation (mainly 
the result of European diseases) steadily increased the per capita tribute 
burden on natives living under encomienda. Evidence suggests that the 
more onerous tribute burdens caused a wave of migration from the 
Peruvian coastal plain, exacerbating the demographic issue.45 Falling 
productivity on tribute dependent haciendas, combined with increased 
food demand as a result of the mining boom, caused a shift away from 
encomenderos’ feudal exaction of rents and toward profitable sales of 
agricultural products.46  
The population loss also contributed to land redistribution as 
many colonists simply occupied abandoned land.47This allowed small, 
rural landholders to stake claims and establish livelihoods in agriculture. 
There is some inconsistency among scholars regarding the prevalence of 
small landholdings in colonial Peru. Bakewell claims that “the [16th] 
century saw the bases of the rural hacienda laid down in smallholdings.”48 
Davies declares that in the 1540s and early 1550s, land distribution was 
relatively equitable but scarcity of arable land, increasing real estate prices, 
increasing returns to scale, and greater capital costs for farms squeezed 
small holders so that by “the mid 1550s, arable tracts increasingly came 
under the control of the wealthier, the better connected, and the more 
enterprising colonists.”49 Yet, Rex Hudson asserts that two landholding 
sectors existed: one consisted of large, Spanish-owned haciendas worked 
by mainly native wage slaves while the other was made up small farms, 
which became increasingly uncompetitive, operated by indigenous 
peoples. He continues: “This left Peru with a legacy of one of the most 
unequal landholding arrangements in all of Latin America.”50 
Assadourian seems to agree with Davies that early decentralization gave 
                                                       
42 Davies, Landowners in Colonial Peru, 21. 
43 Ibid., 22. 
44 Ibid., 23-24. 
45 Ibid., 24.  Depopulation estimates vary widely. Figures for the Peruvian coastal 
plain for 1540 to 1570 range from around 30% to almost 90%.  
46 Bakewell, History of Latin America, 191. 
47 Ibid., , 191. 
48 Ibid., 192. 
49 Davies, Landowners in Colonial Peru, 44-46. 
50 Hudson, Rex A. Peru: A Country Study. 4th ed. (Washington, D.C.: Claitor's 
Law Books and Publishing Division): 1993. Accessed online at 
http://countrystudies.us/peru/7.htm (Dec. 5, 2010)  
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way to consolidation.51 Most historians agree that by the mid- 17th 
century, centralized landholding was the norm. 
The structures of agricultural production and markets were no 
more fluid or efficient than those of precious metal production. Although 
land consolidation and coerced labor forces aided farm output, Spanish 
insistence on European methods, inefficient land use, a shortage of arable 
land, and internal political conflict all hampered the productivity of the 
agricultural sector. Trade restrictions caused wide domestic price 
differentials among geographic areas and even greater discrepancies 
between Peru and other countries, not to mention Spain itself. Poor 
transportation and the vastness of Spanish holdings also contributed to 
the incomplete formation of markets. These factors caused most 
agricultural products to be consumed in the Viceroyalty itself, in Mexico, 
or in foreign American colonies such as Brazil and non-Spanish 
Caribbean Islands (the final grouping would not become a significant 
market until well into the 17th century).   
 
Shipping, Trade, and Transportation 
 
The expanding mining sector of the Peruvian economy 
demanded new trade links and transportation routes for efficient 
movement of goods and people across the vast distances of the 
Viceroyalty. Like agriculture, shipping and transport were mining 
dependencies, and like agriculture and mining, shipping felt the invasive 
and heavy hand of government control and regulation in everyday 
operations. 
Government policy granted the Casa de Contratacion complete 
control over legal shipping to and from Spain’s American colonies in 
1503.52 The Casa created the consulado (merchants’ guild) which attained 
rights to the American colonial trade in Seville. A similar arrangement 
existed in Lima.53 The flow of trade through Lima (port of El Callao) and 
Seville concentrated commerce, wealth, administration, and influence in 
the two metropolises. Merchants headquartered in Lima. Encomenderos and 
other members of Peru’s upper class purchased urban homes in Lima. 
Individuals in the service industry (lawyers, artisans, teachers, merchants, 
estate managers, etc.) set up shop in there.54 The Church, colonial 
administrators, and eventually cultural institutions such as a printing 
press, a university, and a theater followed suit as the colony expanded.    
                                                       
51 Assadourian, “Transfer of the European System of Production, 60. 
52 Mabry, Colonial Latin America, 89. 
53 Ibid., 89. 
54 Hudson, Peru. 
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Long distance trade primarily occurred through oceanic 
shipping. Slower, more expensive, and more onerous overland transport 
by carts, oxen, horses, and mules, occurred only when absolutely 
necessary.55 Additionally, roads were in chronically poor condition. 
Although apparently difficult because of sheer distance traversed, trade 
among the various far-flung realms of the Spanish empire encouraged 
enterprising Spaniards to capitalize on geographic comparative 
advantages. According to Bakewell, “large and specialized zones of 
production [existed] across the empire before 1600.”56  Peruvian wine 
was often shipped to other Spanish colonies, as was surplus grain on a 
less regular basis. Evidence suggests that a significant amount of the 
bullion produced in the colonies was used to purchase colonial goods, 
including basic manufactures and agricultural goods, further energizing 
New World trade.57 Despite many official, nationalistic trade restrictions, 
smuggling was rare during the mid-16th century simply because no other 
European nations established significant colonies prior to the 1600s (with 
the exception of Portugal in Brazil). As more European countries 
established New World colonies, smuggling increased astronomically. 
In the 1570s, adventurous merchants started a small but growing 
commercial network linking the Spanish American colonies with Manila 
and East Asia. American silver was exchanged for ivory, porcelain, 
perfumes, gems, and spices. Throughout most of the 16th century, 
American-Asian commerce lay outside the effective jurisdiction of the 
alarmed monopolists in Seville, allowing market forces to equate supply 
and demand and create much larger mutual gains.58 In addition, foreign 
merchants were allowed to partake in the trade, which drove shipping 
prices down and further increased absolute trade volume.     
Trade between Peru and Europe was significantly more 
complicated, dangerous, and restricted than colonial trade or American-
Asian trade. Nevertheless, exchange between Spain and the American 
colonies increased every year from 1505 to 1610 due to rising colonial 
populations, rising bullion production, and economic expansion.59 
Starting in 1526, individual ships were prohibited from traveling between 
Spain and the colonies; the convoy system was officially mandated to 
protect cargoes from pirates and privateers. The convoy system imposed 
numerous costs on the shipping industry, which, together with the Casa’s 
effective monopoly, distorted transoceanic trade markets. Because regular 
fleets departed each port only twice annually, ships would often moor at 
                                                       
55 Bakewell, History of Latin America, 197. 
56 Ibid., 198. 
57 Brading and Cross, “Colonial Silver Mining,” 546. 
58 Bakewell, History of Latin America, 201. 
59 Ibid., 200. 
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their destination port for months at a time, causing capital depreciation 
and imposing opportunity costs related to idling the ships, despite market 
demand. The merchant monopoly allowed members of the consulado to 
simply raise prices in response to increased costs, but this had the effect 
of reducing the overall volume of trade to the detriment of all involved – 
except the monopolists. The colonists gleaned a certain advantage from 
the chronic and officially endorsed dysfunction of Spanish shipping – 
effective protection from imports that stimulated local industry.60 High 
shipping costs caused Spanish merchants to focus on manufactured 
goods with a high value relative to bulk; this opened a significant portion 
of the lower value-added manufacturing sub-sector to colonial producers.    
   
Manufacturing 
 
As a proportion of total output, manufacturing composed a 
miniscule fraction of Peru’s colonial economy in the 16th century, yet 
several important craft and artisan sectors developed healthy markets 
during that period. The most substantial manufacturing sub-sector in the 
Viceroyalty was cloth-making. For centuries, Native Americans in Peru 
spun and wove llama, alpaca, and vicuña cloth using hand-held spindles 
and backstrap looms.61 Initially, the Spanish drew on these native 
legacies, but enterprising colonists, seeking greater profitability, eventually 
imported novel European technological innovations, notably spinning 
wheels and treadle looms, to increase production.62 The new machines 
allowed production of cloth (carding, spinning, and weaving) within a 
single location, workshops referred to as obrajes (modern Andean Spanish 
translation literally “a textile plant”).63 Obrajes appeared in Peru around 
1560, with many established in native villages by encomenderos.64 
Subsequent shops clustered around colonial cities and towns for access to 
large labor forces, domestic markets, and export firms. Most remained 
dependent on native labor and many were ingrained in the encomienda 
system. At the conclusion of the 17th century, the largest obrajes boasted 
over 200 workers.65  
The efficiency and differentiated products of the Peruvian cloth 
industry permitted limited exports to neighboring colonies, despite 
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European competition.66 However, the industry primarily provided goods 
for Peruvian colonists at lower prices than comparable imports.67 The 
cloth industry grew to become more or less counter-cyclical relative to 
mining; a bulwark for the colonial economy when mining output fell. 
Cloth production was the only “true” non-mining-related industry in the 
Viceroyalty of Peru in the 1500s. 
Other industries with much less economic clout existed in 16th-
century Peru, as well. Bakewell suggests that up to 1560, “probably a 
tenth of [Spanish settlers] were craftsmen, eight hundred or more.”68 
Before the turn of the 17th century, immigrants included types of skilled 
workers immigrated to Peru: tailors, shoemakers, ironsmiths, builders, 
silversmiths, goldsmiths, arms-makers, pharmacists, musicians, and 
candle makers.69 The overwhelming majority of these skilled individuals 
lived and worked in cities, especially the metropolises of Lima and Potosí.  
  
The Labor Force 
 
In the initial decades of Spanish settlement in Peru, conquistadors 
and colonists coerced the relatively large native populations into 
supplying much-needed labor for Spanish enterprises. The Spanish 
utilized a variety of arrangements in order to geographically concentrate 
and most efficiently exploit the indigenous labor force. The most notable 
configuration of Spanish design was the encomienda system, under which 
the Spanish encomendero assumed theoretical responsibility for the material 
and spiritual welfare of an assigned grouping of natives in return for the 
right to exact tribute from his “subjects” in the form of goods or labor.70 
The Spanish also adapted the Incan mita public labor system (originally 
intended for obligatory military service and public works) to serve the 
colonial administration as well as some private enterprises.71 The first 
large-scale Spanish mita scheme was established in 1572 and refined 
several times throughout Spanish colonial rule.72 The mita system was 
utilized in agriculture and public works, but following Viceroy de 
Toledo’s reforms in the 1570s, most indigenous victims of this draft-
labor system worked in Peru’s mines. Mine proprietors preferred mita 
workers to voluntary laborers because the former were paid a 
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significantly lower wage.73 Skilled laborers were paid more for their 
services and often applied for positions voluntarily. (As technological 
innovation displaced skilled laborers, this trend fell steeply).  
In its first year, the Potosí mita drafted about one seventh of the 
indigenous population (approximately 13,500 individuals) in the region 
roughly bounded by Potosí and Cuzco for work in the mines.74 Individual 
workers were divided into three groups with each group working only 
one week of every three. However, nearly all hired themselves out as 
“free workers” during the other two weeks of the cycle, receiving higher 
wages and a small share of their output contribution.75 Conflicting 
evidence and opinions exist regarding the degree of oppression and 
brutality experienced by indigenous workers under the mita system and as 
free laborers. Scholars disagree on the point, and the moral question is 
beyond the scope of this examination. From a purely economic 
perspective the mita system was not essential to the operation of the 
mines; it merely supplied abundant labor at cheaper rates than would 
have prevailed in free labor markets. Additionally, the labor system was 
inefficient, achieved low levels of productivity, and consisted mostly of 
unskilled workers.76 
The integration of Native Americans into the colonial labor 
force, whether by desire or coercion, profoundly influenced the Peruvian 
economy. The massive labor supply allowed for increased output while 
the greater number of consumers stimulated demand for consumer 
goods – most domestic or colonial production due to the prohibitively 
high prices of European imports. However, the major depopulation of 
Native Americans as a result of European diseases drastically reduced the 
labor supply and the mass-market consumer base. The effects of the 
population decline on economic expansion were relieved largely by 
importation of African slaves toward the conclusion of the 16th century 
and the substantial increase in silver output as a result of the adoption of 
amalgamation in the 1570s through the 1590s. Amalgamation also 
reduced the necessary number of labor hours per unit of output. The 
drop in the labor supply had the morbidly beneficial effect of increasing 
the real wage for indigenous and Spanish workers alike.77 Skilled Spanish 
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workers generally practiced their various trades in the cities and mining 
towns where they, in addition to merchants, composed the colonies’ 
middle class. Bakewell estimates that at least one tenth of all settlers 
through 1560 were skilled craftsmen or artisans.78  The native 
depopulation opened vast tracts of land to settlers of little means who 
would attain deeds for abandoned property or simply become squatters 
and establish small, mainly subsistence farms.79 The upper class was 
usually employed in proprietorships of mines and haciendas, or entered the 
civil service where numerous profiteering opportunities – usually at the 
expense of the Spanish government, the indigenous population, or the 
colonists themselves – often presented themselves, and corruption and 




As in Europe, religious orders in Peru were major economic 
participants. Individual parishes and dioceses sought land for churches, 
schools, missions, charities, etc. and operated a wide variety of 
commercial enterprises (purportedly) in order to finance these 
endeavors.80 All profits were theoretically destined to fund “the work of 
God”. The Society of Jesus (the Jesuits) in colonial Peru during the 16th 
century is a fairly representative example of an influential and widely-
invested religious order. In fact, many scholars are of the opinion that the 
Jesuits were the most powerful religious organization in Peru (prior to the 
order’s official expulsion in 1767).81  
Critics of Jesuit influence in Peru allege that commercial profits 
benefited members of the order rather than the “work of God”, while 
apologists believe the level of corruption was infinitesimal. Additionally, 
critics claim that religious orders enjoyed inherent economic privileges 
awarded by a sympathetic government, and unduly dominated regional 
economies while defenders claim that such institutions did not possess 
(or chose not to exercise) much economic sway.82 Evidence suggests that 
although the Jesuits owned vast amounts of land and enjoyed significant 
economic advantages, the Society was considerably less influential and 
domineering than it could have been. The order punched below its 
weight in economic influence. The Jesuits enjoyed easy access to credit, 
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the sympathies of the state and populace (excluding non-Christian 
natives), the benefits of economies of scale, and the potential to leverage 
its holdings to drive out competitors.83 In many respects, the various 
orders and branches of the Catholic Church resembled a multinational 
corporation of the Gilded Age – huge, unbridled by governments, and 
potentially excessively powerful. Yet, the Society of Jesus and other 
religious orders fundamentally differed from the voracious, profit-seeking 
private managers of the Viceroyalty. Evidence suggests that religious 
orders sought only sufficient income to sustain their religious activities 
(for the most part) and thus, declined to pursue a profit-maximizing 
business strategy, despite ample opportunity.84  
Religious orders maintained a heavily favored position in colonial 
society, a reflection of official piety and alleged subservience to God and 
the Catholic Church in Spain. Yet the unique aspects of religious-owned 
business ventures made economic dominance untenable. Moreover, 
religious groups would not reach the height of their economic power 
until a century or more later. Neither the Church nor religious orders 
established excessively dominant economic positions in the Viceroyalty 
of Peru during the 16th century, but both played large roles in civil society 
and operated commercial enterprises alongside the private sector on 




The period between the establishment of the Viceroyalty of Peru 
in 1542 and the turn of the 17th century was one of rapid development, 
profound societal change, and construction of a solid, enduring economic 
foundation in colonial Peru. However, the arduous and disruptive 
mercantilist policies of Spanish colonial administration aimed at 
exploiting the wealth of Peru, routinely hampered growth and efficiency. 
Additionally, state influence distorted shipping and labor markets, 
allowing employers to pay sub-equilibrium wages, reducing the mass-
market consumption base, and prohibitively raising the cost of imports, 
which paradoxically stimulated low value-added domestic manufacturing. 
The heavily-corrupted economic relationship between Peru and Spain 
can only be defined as dysfunctional; neither benefited disproportionately 
or developed natural interdependence. Any mutual reliance was more or 
less dictated by the whims of Spanish officials. Spain attempted to cast 
Peru as a dutiful supplier of bullion and warped the colonial economy to 
that end. Despite the distortions of state policy, private enterprise 
flourished, especially in sectors where the administration neglected to 
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enact and/or enforce regulations. As a result of colonial entrepreneurship 
and the region’s vast mineral wealth, Peru was jewel of the Spanish 
commercial empire in North America; a vital cornerstone of the Spanish 
Empire’s economy.  
But although the economy of the Viceroyalty of Peru 
experienced rapid growth and prosperity throughout the 16th century, and 
despite sporadic internal conflict and the best efforts of Spanish 
policymakers, the expansion was based on weak foundations. During the 
formative period before 1600, government policy created a colonial 
economy that suffered from a narrow mass-market consumer base, over-
reliance on mining, highly stratified social groups, and limited and 
inefficient commercial networks. Peru exhibited economic dynamism in 
the 1500s, but the cornerstone of Spain’s commercial empire was less 
durable than it seemed. With time, the region became trapped in an 
economic prison of stubborn inequality, primary product export 
dependence, labor-intensive production, low productivity, and a dearth of 
long term investment – an enduring legacy which inhibited balanced 
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